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The Geopolitics of the North African Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic:
Opportunities and Challenges
By Muhamad S. Olimat1

Abstract
The sudden outbreak of the Coronavirus in January 2020 took the world by surprise. Initial
state-response was mired by confusion, uncertainty, apprehension, and near demoralization.
However, several countries around the world, including some Middle Eastern and North Africa
countries (MENA) took the challenge seriously in the early stages and set an example to be
emulated globally. The objective of this article is to examine the response of the North African
countries to the pandemic, examine the opportunities and the challenges facing the region, and add
up the lessons learned in order to be better prepared for impending crises facing the nation-state,
the region at large, and the international community. This survey article seeks to highlight the
common denominators whenever possible and examine country-specific conditions that determine
the success or the failure in dealing with the Corona Crisis in Middle East and North Africa.
Keywords: Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Geopolitics, Coronavirus, Pandemic, Regional
Rivalry, International rivalry, The war in Libya, Western Sahara, Economic contraction, Growth

Introduction
January 30, 2020 was unlike any other day at the World Health Organization (WHO). Fears
of the spread of a catastrophic pandemic were confirmed. The WHO declared Covid19, a virus
that originated in the Chinese city of Wuhan a month earlier, a global Public Health Emergency of
International Concern. The WHO informed members of the international community and called
on nations to respond promptly to the threat. As in other parts of the world, North African countries
responded by weighing in many factors like healthcare sector capacity, national resources,
government efficiency, level of popular awareness of public pandemics, regime legitimacy and
public support of the state, leadership, social and political cohesion, fragmentation, conflicts, and
civil wars. These considerations limited state response on a national level, and because support
continues to be insufficient and poor in most of the region, and regional coordination is completely
absent, the situation in North Africa is worsening day by day. The North African region’s
individual country domestic politics, along with regional rivalries and international relations,
determine state response to crises and how each nation will handle a formidable challenge such as
the current epidemic has provided. Regional politics are shaped by the interests of major actors in
global politics such as the US, China, Russia, and the EU. A host of challenges and opportunities
in dealing with national and regional crises is compounded by the complex geostrategic location
of the region, its centrality to international affairs, and the intense rivalry between contending
forces within its borders. The current Coronavirus contagion is teaching us -among other lessonsto develop regional mechanisms to combat the spread of diseases and cross-border crises. Hence,
1
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regional health security needs to be a priority on the agenda of the North African countries, as it
must be as such on the agenda of the international community as well. in fact, in examining the
eco-political outlook of the MENA region in 2022, the Economists identified the Covid-19 as a
major challenge facing the region, in addition to conflicts and wars on national and regional levels.2
North Africa is home to 246,222,458 people. It has an immense economic potential, a rich
culture and history, and a strategic location. This geostrategic context played a pivotal role
throughout history in shaping the modern process of state formation, and the economic
development and stability of the entire Mediterranean nations and the Middle East at large. Over
the past 500 years, the region was under systematic European influence, colonization, direct, and
indirect rule. In fact, the bulk of its current challenges are inherent to its colonial and post-colonial
experiences. Algeria, a case in point, is still suffering from its colonial legacy seven decades after
the departure of French colonial rule. Algeria’s lingering colonial mentality hindered the
construction of a functional government, crippled the process of state formation, and failed to build
a stable economy. Not only that, but currently the nation deals with the agonizing role of the
military in politics, resource-curse politics, regional and international rivalry over control of the
region. The combination of all these factors has deeply affected the state’s ability to respond to a
crisis such as the Coronavirus.
The table below illustrates the population, area, GNI per capita, real GDP annual
percentage change in 2020, the size of GDP, growth rates in 2021, and forecasted 2022 growth
rates, the expenditures on healthcare as percent of the GDP and per/capita expenditures on health
annually. The figures below show that all countries in the region are experiencing negative growth
rates. The situation is catastrophic in Libya, where war conditions compounded with the plague
are bringing economic ruin to the country. But the most astounding case is Algeria, Africa’s largest
country, and one of the wealthiest countries worldwide, with immense natural resources, and a
territory largely unexplored. It enjoyed sustained oil exports over the past seven decades that
accumulated massive capital for a corrupted elite. In fact, Algeria’s destitution is elite made; the
wealth of a nation was deposited in the personal accounts of heads of the army, security agencies,
presidents, and their entourage in Western banks in Western countries. Algeria is on the brink of
bankruptcy. In 2013, its foreign reserves stood at $92.35 billion. In 2020, they dropped to $36.12
billion, and as such they were unable to meet the basic needs of the population for a year and a
half. In 2021, Algeria’s reserves are expected to drop even further to $12,83 billion.3
Meager financial resources in the region -less than 8% at best of the GDP- were allocated
to healthcare per/person when compared to developed economies, which explains the healthcare
sector’s inability to withstand a major crisis. The year 2021, was challenging to Algeria. The IMF’s
end of 2021 report highlighted the fact that, though Algeria’s “economy is gradually recovering
from the concomitant Covid-19 pandemic and oil shocks in 2020…the pandemic has increased
Algeria’s ongoing economic vulnerabilities following a succession of adverse shocks since
2014…the economy is projected to recover in 2021 and 2022, but the outlook remains uncertain
and challenging”4 on a regional level, the Algerian-Moroccan conflict complicated any potential
2

The Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2022. Middle East and Africa: What to Watch For in 2022, accessed on
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3
FRED Economic Data, Algeria’s Foreign Reserves, retrieved on June 24, 2020 at:
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4
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regional response to the pandemic, and other major crises facing the North African region such as
the war in Libya, the Western Sahara conflict, and the ongoing instability in Tunisia. Moreover,
Algeria faced unprecedented ecological catastrophe in the summer of 2021, wildfires in its
northern provinces. Algeria requested international support to put out the fires and mobilized
national resources toward this end. Algeria accused Morocco of providing material support to
saboteurs, whom Algeria accuses of setting off the fires, therefore, contributing to its decision to
cut off diplomatic relation with Morocco. Algeria accused The Movement for Self-Determination
of Kabylia responsible for the catastrophe (MAK), which Algeria classified as a terrorist
organization.
Country
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Table: 1.0 Vital Statistics of North African Countries

Total
Expendit
ure on
health
as % of
GDP/201
7
6.4

Per/Capita
Expenditur
e on health
in
US$/2017

5.3

105.8

4.4

48.8

119.87

5.2

161.0

26.197

5.0*

806

41.805

7.2

250.6

26.156

6.3

193.8

NA

NA

NA

171.76
7
303.08
1
7.89

258.5

Sources:
- IMF-Real GDP/Annual Percent Change at: https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/SDN
- World Bank- Population, country profile at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
- GDP- World Bank in 2022, country profile at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/where-wework
- Total Expenditure on health as % of GDP and per/capita, 2017 WHO at:
https://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.SDGCHEPERCAPITA?lang=en
- * Figures for Libya, in 2014 as no statistics are reported because of the civil war.
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Despite the regional rivalries between Morocco and Algeria, despite the gravity of the
Western Saharan conflict, despite the ongoing civil and proxy war in Libya, despite the economic
and internal security challenges facing Tunisia, despite the countless number of challenges facing
the Sudan, despite the economic, demographic, domestic and political challenges that are facing
Egypt, and despite the economic and domestic challenges that Mauritania is facing, the
Coronavirus pandemics demonstrated that regional coordination is a must. Cross-border
challenges such as plagues, security and economic challenges can only be dealt with on a regional
level. Within this perspective, it is incumbent on the North African countries to establish the North
Africa Crisis Management Center (NACMC), and The North African Taskforce for the
Coronavirus Pandemic. The NACMC would be a permanent institution coordinating the response
of the current crisis on issue-specific cases. The NACMC as an entity is to be entrusted with the
efforts of regional coordination of the major challenges facing the region. Member states of the
NACMC would establish the headquarters in Tunisia -a neutral capital, mandate handling of
regional cross-border crises, and contribute to its functionality. The African Union nations might
want to establish crisis management centers on a regional level, such as:
-

The North Africa Crisis Management Center
The Southern African crisis Management Center
The East Africa Crisis Management Center
The West Africa Crisis Management Center
The Central African Crisis Management Center

The advantages of a regional response are immense. A center that deals with eight countries for
example, would be more effective than one dealing with 54 countries and four territories across
the continent of Africa, given the wide margin of its diversity. Countries would benefit
tremendously from exchanging aid, expertise, and equipment regionally. Morocco is in a better
position to provide expertise and equipment to neighboring Libya, Sudan, and Mauritania.
Similarly, Egypt has medical personnel, while Algeria can provide some financial resources to
build regional capacity.
Response to the Coronavirus should not be limited to the health aspect of the crisis. For
instance, the region receives millions of tourists annually, and as a result it enjoys favorable
economic growth. A successfully managed health crisis will have a positive spill-over effect on
other sectors such as economy and culture, leading to some degree of regional cooperation and
necessary to mitigate such contraction on a regional level. A united North Africa would be in a
much better position to design a regional response than an individual nation could, as in the case
of the Coronavirus pandemic, or the overall regional health security condition. Table 2.0 below,
illustrates the spread of the virus in North African countries in terms of number of cases, deaths
recovery, active, critical, number of tests, and the preparedness of the healthcare sector to
withstand a pandemic.
Table 2: Illustrates total number of cases, deaths, recovery, active, critical, number of tests
per/1 million, and healthcare sector preparedness to a pandemic as of January 13, 2022, in
comparison with the world cases.
Country Total
Deaths
Total
Total
Critic Cases/1mp Deaths/1mp
Number of
Recover Active
al
op
op
Cases
ed
Cases
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World

317,259,965

5,515,1 5,187,62 3,870,1 58,09 1,224,3
62.3
27
4
10
8
Algeria
223,806
6,372
153,469 63,965
122
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209
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395.688107,7 22.042
313,256 43.844
3.758 209
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Mauritan 51,795
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3,762
184,313 34,469
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Libya
395,069
5,813
382.472 6,784
129
56,325
829
Tunisia
756,15561,11 25,731
701.142 29.282
115
62.972
2,143
5
Sudan
49,096
3,358
39,663
6,075
NA
1,081
74
Western 10
2
8
1
NA
16
2
Sahara
Sources: This table is constructed from data provided by the Worldometer Coronavirus
Tracking System at: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/#countries
John Hopkins University COVID-19 Tracking System at: https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
The North African countries scored low on the 2022 Johns Hopkins University Global
Heath Security Index. The table below illustrates some major indicators that pertain to the region
in terms of world ranking, index score out of 100%, income, and healthcare sector preparedness
to deal with a pandemic.
Table 3.0 North Africa’s Rating on the 2022 Johns Hopkins Global Heath Security Index
Country

Index Score/ out Income
of
100%preparedness

Algeria

World
Ranking out
of
195
countries
163

Egypt

153

28.0

Mauritani
a
Morocco

163

26.2

108

33.6

Libya

172

25.3

Tunisia

123

31.5

Sudan

152

28.3

Western
Sahara

NA

NA

26.2
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Preparedness/pan
demics
Upper Middle Least Prepared
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Lower Middle More Prepared
Income
Lower Middle Least Prepared
Income
Lower Middle More Prepared
Income
Upper Middle Least Prepared
Income
Lower Middle Least Prepared
Income
Lower Middle Least Prepared
Income
NA
NA
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Sources: this table is constructed from data accessed on January 20th, 2022, and provided by The
Johns Hopkins-Global Health Security Index at: https://www.ghsindex.org/#l-section--map
In fact, health security cannot be separated from other vital social indicators especially in
the area of education. This is another national concern during a pandemic. Covid-19 in the spring
of 2021 has evidenced a great digital divide in delivering effective distance education. North
African and Middle Eastern countries, even those with substantial economic resources, flopped in
this attempt. Millions of children without laptops and internet connections were not able to
continue their education. The alternative to internet would be to deliver education via national
television stations or establish educational TV networks. The digital gap in the Middle East and
North Africa, strikes the overwhelming majority of the population, not privileged children who
have access to the internet and own a computer.
The table below illustrates the percentage of youth below 24 years in North Africa, and the
estimated number of computers needed for these students to join distance education.
Table 4.0 Population composition in North Africa and the Digital Divide
Population Population
Percentage of the Youth to Estimated number
In millions Growth
Rate the National Population/less of
computers
2019/2020
than 24 Years
needed in millions
Algeria
42,228,42
1.85
43.51
18,158,04
Egypt
102,
1.94
51.63
52,086,300
130,000
Mauritania
4,403,319
2.74
57.27
2,521,780
Morocco
36,029,138 1.20
43.59
15,492,529
Libya
6,678,567
1.38
48.86
3,205,712
Tunisia
11,565,204 1.06
37.37
4,279,125
Sudan
41,801,533 2.42
62.95
25,916,950
Western
597,339
NA
55.73
328,536*
Sahara
Source: Population Growth Rates, World Population Review at:
https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/
Percentage of youth to the national population/less than 24 years old, CIA, country profile at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
Estimated number of computers is calculated 1 laptop/child as of the total population in millions.
Western Sahara in thousands as of the population.
Country

The table above shows the percentage of youth in national population as being the largest
in Mauritania and the Sudan, estimated at 57.27% and 62.95% respectively. There are millions of
children out of school in North Africa, and their ability to receive quality education is drastically
compromised. North African countries are ill equipped to provide distance learning because
technological platforms either nonexistent or inadequate at best. There are major challenges facing
education in North Africa in the future including the improvement of internet services and
networks, better computer availability and accessibility, more virtual schools, and well-equipped
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and tech-savvy teachers. It is essential to state here that, “a great deal of development aid to Africa
has gone into the educational sector, but with only limited success.”5

People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria
Algeria is the worst hit Coronavirus case in North Africa, the third after Iran and Turkey
in the Middle East. In fact, Algeria has started the new year of 2022, with the Fourth Wave of the
pandemic, a wide spread of the virus across the country. It also has the highest mortality rate (13%)
of Arab and North African countries. Algeria’s challenges during this pandemic are worsened by
popular protests that have lasted over a year, by the constant conflict between state and civil
society, the weak institutions of its healthcare sector, the collapse of oil prices that limit the state’s
financial capabilities, the economic decline, and the informal nature of its economy estimated at
57%, a digital gap and the resulting inability to provide an acceptable level of distance education,
the absence of regional coordination, and a protracted conflict with its western neighbor, Morocco,
over Western Sahara, and not least, the repercussions of the war in neighboring Libya.
Algeria’s struggle to respond to the current crisis is the latest link in a chain of failures of
the state over the past seven decades. At the heart of Algeria’s predicament lies the role of military
dominance in politics. Within less than three years of its agonizing independence from France, the
first military coup occurred in 1965. This intervention set the stage for a cycle of violence over
political successions. Algeria today confronts the same challenges of the early 1960s: it still suffers
from the legacy of the post-colonial state, the conditions of state formation, political consolidation,
articulating the role of the military in politics, political diversity, pluralism, and from an overall
chronic crisis of legitimacy and economic accumulation.
The Algerian Revolution and war of independence is the classic case studied in modern
history and literature, and a model for national liberation movements around the world. Algerians
earned the respect of the world by sacrificing over three million martyrs to bring an end to French
colonialism, but soon after their hope to build a unique developmental model was shattered by a
military coup, followed by unprecedented squandering of national wealth, catastrophes of state
legitimacy, and economic devastation.
Algeria’s response to the pandemic is not only restricted by an internal environment of
conflict between state and civil society, or state malfunction, but also by regional wars and
conflicts. The nation is directly influenced by the civil-proxy war in Libya and the instability in
neighboring Tunisia characterized by revolution, rebellions, terrorist attacks, assassinations, and
political violence. Other regional crises pertain to Mali and the endless confrontation with terrorist
organizations at home and in the Sahel region. However, the four-decades confrontation with
Morocco over the annexation of Western Saharan territory is undoubtedly the most critical regional
challenge Algeria faces. Tindouf-Algeria is home to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’s
government in exile, and the second home of the Sahrawi people, a community of refugees
estimated at 173,600. Algeria is the main supporter of the Polisario and the Sahrawi people in their
forty-year struggle for self-determination.
Most recently, Algerian president Tebboune highlighted the (un)willingness of Algeria to
seek credits from the IMF in fear of pressure to compromise on key issues such as Western Sahara

5

Darin Christensen and David D. Laitin, 2019. African States Since Independence; Order, Development, &
Democracy. Yale University Press: New Haven, P. 35.
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and Palestine.6 In its statement to the Non-Aligned Movement Virtual Summit, on May 4, 2020,
Morocco accused Algeria of supporting separatism instead of dealing with the Coronavirus
pandemic at home. This accusation was In response to the statement made by President Tebboune
who called for an emergency UN Security Council meeting “to adopt a resolution asking for an
immediate cessation of hostilities throughout the world…without losing sight of the situation in
the occupied lands, as is the case with Palestine and Western Sahara.” Most certainly, this
statement has infuriated Morocco, which stated that, “despite the exceptional circumstance, a
neighboring country continues to fuel separatism and divert resources from its population to acts
of regional destabilization.”7 Additionally, drawing similarities between Palestine and Western
Sahara on one side, and between Morocco and Israel on the other side is difficult for Morocco to
swallow, to say the least.
Healthcare is the top priority challenge Algeria faces in response to Covid-19. The pitiful
conditions of the nation’s healthcare infrastructure, such as inadequate facilities and trained
medical personnel’s en masse emigration, are the outcome of decades of negligence, corruption,
mismanagement, and embezzlement of public funds. It is scandalous that a wealthy country such
as Algeria is unable to provide the population with facemasks, test kits, and medical gear for
healthcare providers. By January 2022, Algeria ranked 173/195 on the Johns Hopkins Health
Security index, with a low health security score of (26.2), with a -0.06 change since 2019. The
table below illustrates Algeria’s poor healthcare system and its (in)ability to respond to pandemics,
19.6% compared to the world score average of 38.4%, associated with higher percentages in health
risk estimated at 51.4%.
Table. 5.0 Algeria’s Health Security Index- Johns Hopkins University, 2022.
Algeria

Country
World Average
Score/100
Score/100
Prevention Ability
15.3
28.4
Ability to Detect
12.6
32.2
Ability to Respond to Pandemics
25.6
37.6
Health System/Robust – Sufficient 15.0
31.5
Health Norms
38.9
47.8
Health Risk
49.7
55.8
Health Security Index Score
26.2
38.9
Country rank
163/195
Source: This table is constructed from data provided by the Johns Hopkins 2012 Health Security
Index at: https://www.ghsindex.org/country/algeria/
Algeria’s ability to respond to the pandemic is also restricted by the popular protest known
as Hirak (movement for change), ongoing since February 22, 2019, and failure to utilize the
“national solidarity moment” generated by the extraordinary conditions of epidemic to articulate
6

Daily Sabah, May 2, 2020. Algeria Won’t Seek IMF Loan to ease Financial Woes, President Says, retrieved on
June 23, 2020 at: https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/algeria-wont-seek-imf-loan-to-ease-financialwoes-president-says
7
Antonio N. Amuedo, May 7, 2020 in Atalayar, Morocco Accuses Algeria of “Feeding Separatism” and Diverting
Resources to Destabilize the Region”, retrieved on June 23, 2020 at:https://atalayar.com/en/content/moroccoaccuses-algeria-feeding-separatism-and-diverting-resources-destabilise-region
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a state-civil society agenda. The government is accused of taking advantage of the crisis to settle
political grudges with the civil society. The security agencies’ grip on power and their harsh
treatment of the movement have not abated, even though the conditions of the pandemic require a
national reconciliation rather than a conflict-escalation approach. The Algerian youth have been
protesting consistently over a year to dislodge the military and the corrupted ruling elite that
dominates politics since Algeria’s independence. Their efforts were successful in forcing President
Abdulaziz Bouteflika out of office and in delaying presidential elections twice, but the regime
countered with the controversial presidential election of Abdelmadjid Tebboune on December 12,
2019.
Tebboune served as Cabinet Minister and Prime Minister under the Bouteflika
administration. The military and the ruling elite rallied behind his election utilizing the deep state
instruments for this goal. In other words, he is the product of the same regime that Hirak is
attempting to topple. His election demonstrated once again that the regime continues to rely on
coercion as the main instrument for legitimacy, and to pursue regional conflict escalation as a
diversion method. In fact, Tebboune’s election brought no solace to the ailing country; rather, it
aggravated the already tense relations between state and civil society.8
COVID-19 presents a promising opportunity as well for reconciliation between state and
civil society relations. Observers noticed that Algerian security agencies are taking advantage of
the limitations the virus imposes to end the protest by incarcerating prominent figures in the Hirak.
Some were also prosecuted in March and April, the peak months of the pandemic in the country,
which made observers question the priorities of the regime. This would be a “ideal” moment for
the government to demonstrate goodwill toward the legitimate demands of the movement and
utilize its power for mobilization to articulate a national response to the contagion. Instead, even
the Algerian general amnesty excluded those incarcerated for protesting. It has become clear that
ending the protest movement is more crucial to security agencies than containing the pandemic.
Authorities are convinced that the total and “renewable” periods of lockdown imposed by the state
give security agencies the margin of time and space necessary to stifle the Hirak, but it is expected
that the movement will gain more vigor after the Coronavirus subsides. Algeria opted for a militant
course of action compared to other African and Arab countries. However, this sense of militancy
on the part of the state impedes its ability to face the pandemic and mitigate its impact on the
population.
Some observers described the Coronavirus as a “godsend for Algeria’s government to
introduce restrictive measures beyond those needed to contain the COVID-19,”9 while others
described the government’s response as “politicization and weaponization.”10 During the peak of
the pandemic months, early 2020, the Hirak charted for itself a social and a charitable path. It has
been concentrating on delivering a positive message of social solidarity and articulating an
effective methods of mass communication via social media and virtual mobilization and protest.
Additionally, by promoting “virtual brainstorming debates” the movement urges deep thinking
8

For an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the state, civil society and external interests in Africa see Alex
Thomson, 2016. An Introduction to African Politics, Routledge: UK.
9
Adel Hamaizia and Yahia H. Zoubair, May 6, 2020. Algeria’s Perfect Storm: COVID-19 and its Fallout. Chatham
House at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/algeria-s-perfect-storm-covid-19-and-its-fallout
10
Brookings Institute, March 26, 2020. The Brookings Experts on the Implications of the COVID-19 for the Middle
East and North Africa at:
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/brookings-experts-on-the-implications-of-covid-19-for-the-middle-east-andnorth-africa/
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and a “revolutionary reflection” period, rather than conceding, as the state wishes. The standoff
between state and civil society seems to lead toward future collision rather than reconciliation. By
January 20, 2022, Algeria’s vaccination rate was 11% of the population despite the availability of
jabs. The government reinstated the public schools’ closure in its efforts to respond to the Fourth
Wave of Corona in the country.
The Arab Republic of Egypt
Egypt reported its first Coronavirus case on February 14, 2020 and imposed its first
lockdown on March 24. In these thirty-eight days, authorities were paralyzed by the onset of a
viral pandemic among a population that exceeds 100 million juxtaposed to the now highlighted
abysmally inadequate healthcare infrastructure. Anxiety was growing as Egyptians were given
minimal and inaccurate information on how the virus spread, how to prevent contagion, and how
to treat it. The government denied the existence of the virus for over five weeks. This delay
undermined the authorities’ articulation and coordination of a unified multi-agency response to the
infection. An alternate response could have been designed as early as January 27 when Egyptian
authorities suspended flights outbound and inbound from China. A proactive approach was
necessary, but in February there was still obscurity, uncertainty, and confusion for most countries
in the Middle East and around the world, as nations struggled to comprehend the scope of the
pandemic. Countries that lagged in quarantining the population bore a heavy toll of casualties, as
in Italy, the UK, Spain, the US, and Brazil. Egypt’s case resembled Italy because both countries
receive millions of tourists annually. Egypt received 12 million tourists in 2019, especially
European and Chinese tourists. Tourism as a sector accounts for over 10%, of its GDP annually.
In fact, the early cases detected in Egypt were in the tourist industry.
Nearly six weeks from the early detection of the first cases in February, the Ministry of
Health denied the existence of infections, stating that, “there are no actual or suspected cases of
corona in Egypt.”11 This was the critical period, but this trend of denial was not unique to Egypt;
Spain, Italy, the UK, and the US were in identical conditions. Had the state been more transparent,
it could have put an end to the pandemic in February. The unclear and uncertain state response in
the months of January, February and up to the end of March shaped the popular view of the
Egyptian people about the virus and the (in)ability of the government to combat it.
Several factors determine and measure the level of efficiency of state policies in combatting
the plague. First, even though Egypt have had medical schools much earlier than neighboring
Middle Eastern and African countries, with a long tradition of acceptable health care service, its
public healthcare system deteriorated over time. One scourge of Egypt’s modern healthcare is the
physician “brain drain” that bleeds out much needed expertise. A percentage estimated in hundreds
of thousands of its most skilled medical doctors is practicing abroad. The country scored poorly
on the Johns Hopkins 2019 Health Security Index, ranking 87/195 with an overall score of health
security at 39.9. Egypt scored average and below average compared to world average scores.
Table. 6.0 Egypt’s Health Security Index - Johns Hopkins University, 2022.
Egypt
Prevention Ability

Country
Score
15.7

World
Score/100
28.4

Average

11

Maged Atef, April 30, 2020. Egypt’s Bitter Options in the Face of Coronavirus. The Washington Institute at:
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/Egypt-Coronavirus-Transparency-Response-Madbouly-Sisi
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Ability to Detect
18.9
32.2
Ability to Respond to Pandemics 20.9
37.6
Health
18.8
31.5
Health Norms
33.3
47.8
Health Risk
60.3
55.8
Index Score
28.0
38.9
Ranking/195
153/195
Source: This table is constructed from data provided by the Johns Hopkins 2022 Health Security
Index at: https://www.ghsindex.org/country/egypt/
Secondly, neither the public or private sector, nor the military or healthcare systems
individually can handle a widespread crisis. Egypt would stand a fair chance if the three parties military, public and private healthcare systems- acted in unison and worked together to articulate
an integrated national approach to pandemics. Jordan and Morocco are an example of how this
effort was orchestrated.
A third aspect of government response is transparency in matters related to the pandemic,
especially reporting accurate numbers of infected cases. Lack of clarity bred suspicion, rumors,
and societal confusion, and led to unbridled speculation on social media. Speculators were
subjected to state sanctions and arrests on the grounds of undermining national unity and spreading
false information. In fact, some local and international media outlets voiced concerns about the
accuracy of number of cases reported in the country after the publication of a peer-reviewed article
by The Toronto General Hospital Research Institute, stating that, based on its modules, Egypt had
19,130 cases while the government only reported 495 cases on March 15.
A fourth element, Egyptian society feeds on social media and on traditional sources of
information like radio, TV, and newspapers, as well. Egyptian socio-popular narrative is also
expressed in verbal communication, sarcasm, humor, and satirical anecdotes more than any other
people in the Middle East and North Africa. This is an environment conducive for the spread of
rumors and sarcasm. The government attempted to manipulate the narrative of the Coronavirus,
controlling the flow of information on the number of affected cases, preparedness, resources, and
combat plans. Furthermore, government media outlets denied space to alternative sources of
information to avoid influencing public opinion on government response to the crisis.
Transparency is a much more effective strategy. An open approach, coupled with popular national
mobilization, might have yielded unprecedented positive outcomes, as Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan,
Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and other countries in the Middle East and North Africa
demonstrated.
Egyptians are patriotic in nature. They refer to their country as ‘Mother of Mankind.’ The
Covid-19 crisis is a great opportunity for the government to rally the people on patriotic grounds
and expand its regime legitimacy, support, and establish national reconciliation. It is a chance to
tap into human resources and create a sense of social solidarity.
Egypt’s poor and vulnerable are estimated to be at around 33 million citizens, one third of
the entire population of the country, is hit hard by the virus. This segment relies on informal
economic activities for sustenance. It is estimated that 50% of Egypt’s economic activity is
conducted within the informal sector, and employees in this “shadow economy” are resentful of
curfews and lockdowns. They also live in crammed dwellings in marginal neighborhoods of major
cities like Cairo and Alexandria, making them extremely susceptible to contracting the virus. This
is yet another opportunity for the government to expand the social safety net for its most vulnerable
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citizens by providing them employment benefits, including them in the social security system and
emergency assistance programs, local development programs, poverty- alleviation programs, and
relief efforts. Civil society also has an opportunity to partner with the state or take the lead,
especially in entirely ignored regions. In general, charitable organizations in Egypt are ahead of
the government in providing some assistance to the poor. International organizations have also
stepped up their programs in Egypt, especially UN affiliated agencies. The World Bank and the
the World Health Organization have also provided some financial support.
The meager economic gains achieved in five years of austerity programs are now seriously
compromised by the economic shutdown, by small and medium businesses going bankrupt, rising
unemployment rates, and by the dwindling tourist industry. In fact, the first cases of the virus were
detected in this sector. Finally, while Egypt has made significant progress in responding to the
crisis, currently it is facing the Fourth Wave of the spread of the virus across the country in early
January 2022. It’s ability to contain the latest variant (Omicron) is limited by Vaccine-Hesitancy
(VH) among the population.
The State of Libya
Libya recorded its first Coronavirus case on March 24, 2020. Libya has been torn by a
decade-long civil and proxy war in which the warring factions seem currently to be more interested
in territorial gains than in containing the spread of the pandemic. In fact, Eastern and Western
forces have been exchanging higher than normal levels of armed reprisal, aiming at a total control
of Tripoli. The war has also caused increased restrictions on the press where journalists and even
medical doctors cannot report accurate statistics on the contagion in territories under the militias
and the two waring governments.
An end to the war in Libya is not in sight. The broader geopolitical context of the conflict
is complicated. There are domestic factors at play, a fragmented country polarized by the
emergence of two rival governments, militias, and armed coalitions. The legacy of the Gaddafi
regime still looms over Libya a decade after its collapse. One of the outcomes of the 2011 Libyan
revolution was the abhorrent polarization of the country into four regions that are seemingly
incompatible. Division and animosity make it impossible to form a national government, not to
mention national cohesion, power consolidation, and a potential peace process.
European rivalry over interests in Libya is the single most detrimental factor in the
prolonged conflict. The European Union fails to articulate a clear strategy toward Libya because
of the incompatibility of interests among France and Italy in Libya. In fact, the two countries have
competing interests and adversarial perspectives when it comes to military support to combatants.
Italy is on the side of the Government of National Accord, while France strongly supports General
Khalifa Heftar to protect its strategic interests -energy, resource extraction, military bases and
security, and trade. Italy, a former colonial power also has similar strategic interests -energy,
markets, raw materials, uranium deposits, and curbing illegal immigration.
The flawed and dysfunctional healthcare system is its second most detrimental factor. The
complexity of the Libyan conflict, with unyielding geopolitical interests and a fragile healthcare
infrastructure, spells disaster in combatting the spread of the Corona pandemic. Libyan militia is
restricting international humanitarian organizations’ efforts toward civilians. Combatants target
healthcare facilities, hospitals, clinics, water sources, and power stations in total disregard for the
basic needs of the population. Libya’s healthcare sector is undermined by decades of corruption
and mismanagement. Over the past five decades, the country also experienced a brain-drain
phenomenon: the overwhelming majority of Libyan doctors, nurses, and paramedics left the
country to practice in Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Arab Gulf region.
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Healthcare in Tripoli is already under enormous stress from war casualties. Hence, the
arrival of the virus compounds that much more the need for healthcare professionals.
The table below illustrates Libya’s overall ranking on the Health Security Index in all categories:
168/195, the lowest in North Africa. Its ability to prevent, detect, and respond is extremely poor
and much below the average globally. This is a clear indication of the dysfunctional and fragile
status of its healthcare.
Table. 7.0 Libya’s Health Security Index- Johns Hopkins University, 2022.
Libya

Country
World
Average
Score
Score/100
Prevention Ability
11.1
28.4
Ability to Detect
28.3
32.2
Ability to Respond to Pandemics 31.1
37.6
Health
13.0
31.5
Health Norms
31.3
47.8
Health Risk
36.7
55.8
Index Score
25.3
38.9
Ranking/195
172
Source: This table is constructed from data provided and accessed on January 13, 2022, by the
Johns Hopkins-Health Security Index at: https://www.ghsindex.org/country/libya/
The systematic attacks on what remains of Libya’s healthcare services, hospitals, and
clinics, is in clear violation of international law. It is also a violation of the ceasefire. Probably, the
most devastating factor undermining Libya’s ability to pursue a peaceful path in resolving the
ongoing conflict is the division between its two main regions, East and West, and the existence of
two rival governments in Tripoli and Tobruk, each of which has its own policies and limitations
in dealing with the Covid-19. Therefore, this political and territorial division, and the catastrophic
conditions of the war create an ideal environment for the proliferation of the virus.
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania
Nouakchott reported its first Coronavirus case on March 13, 2020. The country’s
healthcare sector is weak in nature but is exacerbated by the pandemic. The government devotion
of some financial resources to the healthcare sector, to meet the challenge has resulted in an
immediate imbalance in its national budget, estimated at $370 million. That step prompted a
request for and approval of an emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund estimated at
$130 million. The Corona crisis is hitting Mauritania harder than neighboring countries, given the
weakness of its economy and its heavy reliance on food imports. The informal nature of its
economy renders the population vulnerable at times of economic contraction and economic crises.
Its 2020 growth rate is expected to be within the negative margins, estimated by the IMF at -2%.
Therefore, socio-economic challenges are mounting. Mauritania scored poorly on the Global
Health Security Index, ranking 157/195, in the lowest category. Its ability to prevent pandemics is
very low (9.9), much below the international average. It also scored much lower on other
indicators, as the table below illustrates.

Table. 8.0 Mauritania’s Health Security Index- Johns Hopkins University, 2022.
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Mauritania

Country
World
Average
Score
Score/100
Prevention Ability
1.9
28.4
Ability to Detect
26.7
32.2
Ability to Respond to Pandemics 28.5
37.6
Health
21.0
31.5
Health Norms
37.8
47.8
Health Risk
41.3
55.8
Index Score
26.2
38.9
Ranking/195
163
Source: This table is constructed from data provided by the Johns Hopkins 2022 Health Security
Index at: https://www.ghsindex.org/country/mauritania/

In terms of geopolitical challenges, Mauritania’s main security threats originate in
neighboring Mali where terrorist organizations are operating. The latest threat resulted in a wave
of refugees estimated to be 1300, mostly women and children, who entered the country between
February 9 and March 12, 2020. While the government quarantined the refugees and provided
them with some basic needs, the potential for diseases among refugees is still high, and will most
likely increment the spread of coronavirus.
Mauritania’s efforts in containing the pandemic are hampered by its inability to control its
borders. It needs the support of neighbors like Algeria, Mali, Senegal, and Morocco to combat the
infiltration of terrorist organizations, and the high probability that they will carry the virus
throughout the region. Another related security challenge pertains to Western Sahara and the
absence of resolution to the conflict so far.
A third threat comes from European residents and tourists who travel back and forth
between the two regions, ignoring the quarantine rules. Nouakchott deported some unruly
Europeans from France and Spain. Mauritania called on the European countries to collect their
citizens.
A fourth factor that limits Mauritania’s ability to respond to the pandemic is monetary in
nature. Nouakchott appealed to its traditional allies and friends for assistance, and the USAID
provided an estimated package of $250,000. China, France, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi
Arabia sent tons of medical equipment, masks, and protective gear to Mauritania to assist in
confronting the infection. The World Health Organization is aiding Mauritania in dealing with the
pandemic. It is essential to allude to the fact that, a country-specific approach is the answer for
countries with deficient healthcare who are unable on their own to meet the challenge. The poor
healthcare sector in Mauritania, the poor overall infrastructure, and the weakness of the state to
tackle a pandemic like the Coronavirus necessitates such approach. That does not diminish the
value of regional cooperation as well.
Three regional organizations can assist Mauritania in dealing with the health challenge: the
Arab League, the African Union, and the European Union. The Arab League’s health ministers are
tapping into their financial resources and have been in contact to contain the threat in the region.
Yet, a regional answer to coronavirus has not emerged. Similarly, calls for an Africa-continental
approach has not materialized. The geographic proximity of North Africa to southern Europe
forms one-zone for the pandemic. Clearly, the EU’s priority is to deal with the infection in its
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territory, but the spread of the virus in neighboring regions will only exacerbate Europe’s efforts
to eradicate it at home.
The US, France, and China, three major international actors, should not overlook
Mauritania’s geostrategic location, especially under the conditions of the current crisis. The
American presence in Mauritania and in the northwestern part of Africa is necessary for
combatting the threat of terrorist organizations hindering the stability of the region. France is a
former colonial power and a powerbroker in the country, while China has a growing economic
portfolio of interests unmatched by any of its rivals. Chinese corporations are present in mineral
extraction, in the construction sector, and in offshore fishing. In fact, Mauritania’s coastline
converges southwestern Atlantic with northern Atlantic currents creating a rich environment for
the fishing industry. China signed a controversial 25-year bilateral industrial fishing agreement
with Mauritania in 1991 (renewed in 2012) worth $100 million. The agreement was forced through
parliament despite opposition and popular disapproval because it debilitates Mauritania’s fish
reserves and threatens its local fishing sector.12 Obviously, domestic, regional and international
factors do hinder the ability of Mauritania to face major challenges such as pandemics. Its
geopolitical environment, and inability to control its borders, represents a hurdle for the
containment of Coronavirus pandemic.
The Kingdom of Morocco
The Kingdom of Morocco announced its first Coronavirus infection on March 2 and
recorded its first fatality on April 10, 2020. This represents a low mortality rate compared with
neighboring countries and the rest of the world. Soon after the detection of the contagion, the
government implemented a crisis management plan, declared a health emergency in mid-March,
provided free testing, imposed a travel ban and a nationwide curfew, and mobilized its military
and security agencies to implement the directives. Additionally, the government mobilized the
private, public, and military healthcare institutions to support the infected. It also pursued a
transparent campaign to disseminate accurate information to the public and curb the spread of
rumors. This explains the fact that, Moroccans followed government instructions, especially those
towards the curfews, with some exceptions. The Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis conducted
a poll between March 14 and 19, revealed that “82% of Moroccans completely avoided leaving
their homes, and 88% would not consider any form of traveling at this time.”13 An impressive
accomplishment in a society that highly values social and family relationships.
The government of Morocco devoted 2.7% of its GDP to establish a national fund to deal
with the pandemic. The King, members of the cabinet, the parliament, the business community,
and the public contributed to the fund, accumulating over € 3 billion. Cabinet ministers and public
officials took the Coronavirus test and announced the results to the public to demonstrate
transparency. Morocco’s Government declared a state of emergency, pursued a campaign for
social distancing utilizing social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.), and imposed a fourweek curfew starting March 20, 2020. Not only that, but to contain the spread of the virus in
penitentiaries the government freed over 5000 prisoners of petty crimes. It also imposed a severe
travel ban even though tourism contributes to the economy over 10% directly to the GDP, and up
to 15% indirectly. The sector employees over 10 million Moroccans.
12

Muhamad Olimat, 2014. China and North Africa
Jonathan Fenton-Harvey, March 31, 2020. Morocco’s Cohesion and Solidarity is a Lesson to Us all, Byline Times
at: https://bylinetimes.com/2020/03/31/the-coronavirus-crisis-moroccos-cohesion-and-solidarity-is-a-lesson-to-usall/
13
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Morocco’s overall Health Security Index is assuring. In most categories, it is within or
above the world average as illustrated in Table 8.0. Morocco scored better than any of its neighbors
in North Africa, with a world ranking of 68/195. Its ability to detect and respond to the pandemic
is relatively high compared to the region and the Greater Middle East.
Table. 9.0 Morocco’s Health Security Index- Johns Hopkins University, 2022
Morocco

Country
World
Average
Score
Score/100
Prevention Ability
29.3
28.4
Ability to Detect
27.9
32.2
Ability to Respond to Pandemics 28.0
37.6
Health
30.8
31.5
Health Norms
33.2
47.8
Health Risk
52.5
55.8
Index Score
33.6
38.9
Ranking/195
108
Source: This table is constructed from data provided by the Johns Hopkins Health Security Index
accessed on January 13, 2022, at: https://www.ghsindex.org/country/morocco/
Morocco produces sufficient facemasks for the entire population, estimated at 10 million
daily and has stored an estimated 50 million mask part for its strategic reserves. The government
has also digitalized its emergency response, using a tracking application developed by the General
Directorate for National Security.
Morocco’s labor force is most impacted by the epidemic, reflecting negatively on the
economy. The Moroccan Economic Monitoring Committee created a digitalized system in which
informal sector laborers eligible for assistance enter their Social Security Numbers (SSN) and
receive a code that enables them to withdraw an amount of money from financial institutions across
the country. Laborers with SSN can access the system through their cell phone and register for
future benefits with the Social Security Department. While the informal sector in Morocco
accounts for 38%, the IMF stated that, “only a minority of workers are covered by social security,
which also contributes to greater informality in the labor market. The current social protection
system is highly fragmented.”14
The pandemic is also affecting Morocco’s tourist economy. Morocco received 13 million
tourists in 2019. It established its legitimacy in international tourism as an attractive destination,
but by March 15, Rabat announced a shutdown of its airports and ports, and suspension of inbound
and outbound flights from major destinations in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, and
Africa. The closure left thousands of tourists stranded. However, step by step, Morocco managed
to repatriate most of them, except those who preferred to stay in the country given the bleak outlook
and quick transmission of the virus in Spain, France, and the UK. Spain, who occupies two
Moroccan cities since 1492, is managing the Ceuta and Melilla border crossing, where thousands
of Europeans left Morocco on ferries toward Spain and other European destinations. Special
charter jets and flights were also arranged to evacuate tourists from other parts of the world.
14

Babacar Sarr, Mokhtar Benlamine, and Zsuzas Munkacsi, 2019. The Macroeconomic Effects of Labor Market
reform in Morocco, IMF Working Papers, P. 9.
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Moroccans demonstrated unprecedented levels of hospitality to tourists stranded in the
country. Instead of viewing the situation with a business-oriented mentality of hiking prices and
taking advantage of foreigners, they opened their homes and schools to house stranded tourists,
offered hotels free of charge, and provided them with shelter, food and healthcare services. While
Corona has dealt the tourism and hospitality sector a blow, it is expected that it will recover within
two to three years. Currently, the government is attempting to mitigate the impact of the pandemic
by encouraging domestic tourism, similar to other countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan.
Social solidarity tops the list of the Moroccan response to the pandemic. The country is
witnessing a revival of “patriotism” demonstrated by citizens rallying behind the flag, the
government, and the healthcare sector. This sense of patriotism is coupled with a sense of
“religious” and spiritual solidarity in the holy month of Ramadan. To demonstrate social solidarity
and soften the impact of the closure of mosques in Ramadan, Moroccans prayed on the roofs of
their houses, reciting the holy Quran, calling for Allah to lift the pandemic in the holy month. Most
notably, business owners transformed their shops to produce facial masks for healthcare workers,
and average citizens donated food and aided the less fortunate. A related factor to the national
campaign to counter the virus is the immediate transformation of some industries to produce health
technologies necessary to combat the pandemic, like facemasks, ventilators, sanitizers, and other
equipment
The King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, called for a unified African continental approach
to the crisis in 2020, but Rabat’s ability to lead this charge is limited by the four-decade conflict
over the Western Sahara territory, its prolonged struggle with Algeria, and its dispute with Spain
over Ceuta and Melilla. While the virus outbreak represents a geostrategic liability to Rabat, it may
also provide Morocco with an opportunity to settle some regional conflicts and engage in a conflict
resolution process with neighboring Algeria. The calamity may also worsen regional conflicts. It
has led to a realignment of Morocco with Israel, and therefore, escalating the conflict with Algeria,
which views such step as a major threat to its national security. Algeria has recently conducted
live ammunition maneuvers viewed by Morocco as provocative and a policy of diversion from
domestic crises. While Morocco made no clear indication to escalate into an all-out war, it may
act under pressure from its military and security agencies, and therefore escalate the conflict
leading to another unwanted regional conflict in North Africa.
The Republic of Tunisia
The first case of Coronavirus was detected in Tunisia on March 2, 2020. On the Global
Health Security Index, Tunisia ranked poorly, 123/195. It also scored below world average in all
categories, except the ability to respond to the pandemic, which is marginally above average, while
scoring above average in the health risk category. These figures are most certainly unsatisfactory,
but they are an expected outcome after decades of negligence and corruption in the healthcare
system.
Table. 10.0 Tunisia’s Health Security Index- Johns Hopkins University, 2022
Tunisia
Prevention Ability
Ability to Detect
Ability to Respond to Pandemics
Health

Country
Score
21.9
20.4
41.9
13.0
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World
Score/100
28.4
32.2
37.6
31.5

Average
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Health Norms
33.7
47.8
Health Risk
57.7
55.8
Index Score
31.5
38.9
Ranking/195
123
Source: This table is constructed from data provided by the Johns Hopkins Health Security Index
– accessed on January 13, 2022, at: https://www.ghsindex.org/country/tunisia/
Tunisia’s response to the pandemic in 2020 was shaped primarily by its domestic political
environment, by the socio-economic and political developments occurring over the past ten years,
governed by the ongoing process of transition to democracy, a growing sense of regime legitimacy,
and a vibrant civil society. It is also shaped by its parliamentary life, the relative independence of
the judiciary, a professional armed force, and popular participation in public affairs. Tunisia enjoys
an active and educated public opinion informed by a large segment of the cyber generation youth,
and the role of an expanding middle class. The positive interaction and mobilization of these forces
produced immediate results in combatting the Coronavirus.
The government of Prime Minister Elyes Al Fakhfakh assumed responsibility on February
26, 2020, an outcome of an agonizing process of coalition building and struggle among the
competing political forces in the country. Soon after, and due to the “stay home” mandates,
Tunisia’s parliament delegated some of its powers to the executive, permitting the PM to govern
by decree. The legislative sought to empower the executive to make decisions much faster to deal
with the crisis. In fact, both the legislative and the judiciary transferred to virtual status, and gave
the office of the executive, President Kais Saied, and the prime minister immediate power to
mobilize state and society to combat the contagion. The executive has a wide range of agencies at
its disposal such as the armed forces, security agencies and civil defense forces, the national
Security Council, the National Coronavirus Response Authority, the Response and Rescue
Organization, the National Committee for Disaster Prevention, the Response and Relief
Organization, the Regional Committee for Disaster Prevention, and several other agencies.
State and civil society are working rather harmoniously, compared to neighboring countries
like Algeria, Libya, or Mauritania. Tunisia established a ‘virtual war room’ to deal with the health
crisis, and mobilized government and non-governmental organizations, scientists, and medics.
Tunisian scientists developed their own respirators to meet the growing demand and manufactured
reasonable quantities of facemasks. The authorities also digitalized the crisis response using EGovernment to provide services for the public, as well as using the available technology of drones
and robots.
The Tunisian government devoted $850 million to tackle the social and economic impact of the
crisis, expanding poverty-alleviation programs, providing unemployment benefits to eligible
segments of society, reducing taxes and interest rates. However, the ability of the state to provide
services is shaped by its economic outlook. It is expected that the Tunisian economy will contract
by 4.3%, and the unemployment rate will rise to 25%. The government requested IMF support,
which granted an emergency loan for Tunisia to deal with the Coronavirus of $745 million. On
April 20, the World Bank also approved $35 million to boost the healthcare system in fighting the
pandemic.
There are several other noteworthy aspects of Tunisia’s immediate first response to Covid19. First, Al Fakhfakh portrayed the pandemic as a “war” against an invisible enemy that threatens
the nation and the world. His words were flanked by an emotional statement by health minister
Habiba Zehi Ben Romdhane who broke into tears during a press conference, saddened by the

https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol23/iss3/11

170

Olimat: The Geopolitics of the North African Response to the Coronavirus

growing number of early infections and deaths. Such vivid messages were bound to mobilize the
public. Secondly, the state declared a strict lockdown, imposing sanctions, and arrests for violators.
In other words, the leadership formed a unified front with a strategy activating financial, economic,
and coercive measures to deal with the threat. A third positive aspect is the scientific slant in the
mobilization process. While Tunisia is well-known for its politicization of public discourse, in this
case it concentrated on the medical narrative rather than the usual political bickering and settling
of political scores.
A fourth aspect is that Tunisian civil society demonstrated a strong sense of solidarity. For
example, the business community activated its resources to produce facemasks, disinfectant gels,
medical gear, and distributed foodstuff for the needy. The cyber generation provided hopeful
messages, battled false online news, and disseminated accurate information regarding the virus.
Lastly, in terms of geopolitics, because Tunisia is located on the fault lines of an
international migration route, regional conflicts, and violent extremism and terrorism. Its national
government and process of transition remains fragile. Any added stress to the regional environment
is bound to exacerbate such vulnerability. A case in point is the decade-long attrition and proxy
war in Libya. As a result, Tunisia’s national security is threatened by the increase of illegal
immigration, street violence, and the growing presence of terrorist organizations, home-grown or
regional. To deal with these issues, the country needs urgent support from the international
community, but so far, due to the ongoing conflict between France and Italy over energy interests
in Libya, the European Union, which is most affected by these forces, has only offered a
fragmented response.
The above-mentioned optimism in 2020 withered away by unfortunate political
developments in Tunisia in 2021. The political forces in the country continued to clash within the
parliament, primarily between the Islamists and nationalists leading to a stalemate and violence.
On July 25 the president suspended the parliament and centralized most of state powers and
authorities strictly within the office of the presidency. Such step alarmed Tunisian and the
international community of the return of dictatorship to the country. Since then, protest, clashes
and violence have become part of the daily life in Tunisia. Such societal tension most certainly
impacted the ability of the government to deal with the Coronavirus pandemic. By January 2022,
Tunisia seems to be facing major challenges in dealing with the crisis, particular in testing, tracing,
and vaccinations. Such challenges are associated with political unrests, and near economic
collapse.
The Republic of Sudan
Sudan ranked 185/195 on the Global Health Security Index, marking it as one of the most
vulnerable countries to pandemics, with very low ability to detect and respond to diseases. This is
a natural outcome of decades of systematic corruption, and mismanagement on the side of military
regimes governed the country since the 1958. Sudan was also under stringent sanctions over the
past three decades, and therefore, the Sudanese healthcare system and infrastructure deteriorated
incrementally. Hospitals suffered shortages of equipment, medicines, and healthcare professionals.
Sudanese doctors were renowned in Middle Eastern medical establishments, and the school of
medicine at Khartoum University was a source of national pride. Once the wealthiest country in
the region in terms of natural resources, minerals, and agricultural potential, the Sudan went
bankrupt, impoverished by a power-hungry regime that failed on every front. The Sudan falls into
the WHO’s category of most vulnerable countries; hence, unable to meet the Coronavirus
challenge on its own. It has appealed to international organizations like the World Bank, the IMF,
and donors.
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Table. 11.0 Sudan’s Health Security Index- Johns Hopkins University, 2022
Sudan

Country
World
Average
Score
Score/100
Prevention Ability
22.5
28.4
Ability to Detect
15.8
32.2
Ability to Respond to Pandemics 42.9
37.6
Health
12.8
31.5
Health Norms
41.7
47.8
Health Risk
34.1
55.8
Index Score
28.3
38.9
Ranking/195
185
Source: This table is constructed from data provided by the Johns Hopkins Health Security Index
accessed on January 13, 2022, at: https://www.ghsindex.org/country/sudan/
One detrimental situation is the Sudan’s laboratory testing capacity and unavailable testing
kits, one of lowest rates -150 tests per day for 39 million people. This is a terrifying figure
underscores the likelihood of a much higher number of infected but undetected cases. The
minimum capacity should be 40,000 test per day, nearly impossible to achieve on short notice. The
WHO has an active program, and Medecins Sans Frontieres runs hospitals and clinics in the
country. On April 22, 2020, the United Arab Emirates also provided essential support by delivering
a shipment of seven tons of medical supplies, mainly test kits. This is part of the UAE’s outreach
efforts, where it delivered 277,000 tons of medical supplies to 25 vulnerable countries around the
world.15
Understandably, the Sudan’s mixed government response will determine the political
future of the country. The civil government’s failure to deal with the outbreak will erode its
legitimacy and give the military the opportunity to accomplish the goals of the 2019 military coup.
Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdouk is under scrutiny from the public, the donor community, the
international and human rights organizations, neighboring countries, and leading figures in the
international community. He must demonstrate a high level of leadership under the conditions of
this unfolding crisis. Any wobbly response will create the impression that he is incompetent to
lead, which will be detrimental to Sudan’s future. The process of transition from military to civilian
political leadership is attainable with the international community’s support, otherwise this will be
another squandered opportunity, as in 1964, 1985, and 1989 of Sudan’s modern history.
Sudan’s overall response to the current infectious disease is shaped by its geostrategic
environment, by domestic, regional, and intentional factors. In the past two decades, The Sudan
went through internal instability, rebellions, and a genocide. The recent 2019 military coup put an
end to three decades of General Omar Hasan Al Bashir’s corrupted military junta. Under his rule,
the Sudan was reduced to a position of subservience, and placed on the list of countries that support
international terrorism. A civil war led to the cessation of South Sudan in 2011, and an escalation
of the conflict in Darfur led to a genocide. There were also rebellions in the eastern part of the
country, with support even in the north, the center for regime power.
Sudan’s economy was crippled by international sanctions imposed by the US, the EU, and
the UN due primarily to the genocide in Darfur. Sudan was totally isolated from the international
15
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community, and its circle of friends was very limited. International financial institutions excluded
the Sudan from the trends of investment and growth.
The regime’s most catastrophic choice was to fragment the country. Sudan’s chronic crises
date back to the colonial era and the post-colonial state. Colonial administrative structures, cultural
differences, and a religious divide created the necessary conditions to split the country in two.16
While southern forces declared beforehand their intention to preserve the territorial integrity of the
Sudan, the central government produced the necessary conditions for the south to secede after a
national referendum was approved by 99% of the population. The Republic of South Sudan
became the latest country to join the international community on July 9, 2011. Remarkably,
General Bashir joined the independence celebration representing “his” country at the festivities.
When it comes to political violence, the most devastating event was associated with the
regime’s response to the protest in the western region of Darfur in 2003. The demonstrations aimed
to draw the attention of the state to deteriorating public services, and the abject poverty among the
population. The people of Darfur demanded equal share with other regions in terms of
development, employment opportunities, education, healthcare services, and infrastructure
projects. Darfurian movements were “rising up against the Sudanese government’s economic,
political and asocial marginalization of populations living in the peripheries of Sudan and beyond
the government center in Khartoum.”17 The regime opted for a security approach using
overwhelming force against the protesters, and soliciting the support of local militia. This led to a
genocide that killed over 300,000 people, according to the United Nations, after which the regime
was placed under stringent international sanctions.
Sudan’s regional geopolitical outlook is also challenging. Some steps to confront regional
threats include its partnership with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and its attempt to reconcile the
dispute with Egypt over the border region of Halyeb. However, existentially, the threat comes
from Ethiopia over the Renaissance Dam. Israel is also a security threat to the Sudan. This explains
the fact that, the Head of Sovereignty Council, General Abdulfattah Al-Burhan, met with Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 4, 2020, in Uganda. Over the past two decades,
Sudan has been subjected to repeated Israeli attacks of suspected locations allegedly providing
weapons to the Palestinians. The transitional government in Sudan is also convinced that
improving ties with Israel, initiating negotiations, utilizing the Israeli lobby in Washington DC to
influence the administration and Congress will most certainly yield positive results toward
removing American sanctions.
Khartoum enjoys the support of two leading Arab countries: Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
In the national interest of both countries (as well as of the Arab world), they pledged to support
the political and economic transition to stabilize and develop the Sudan. UAE corporations are
willing to invest in the country’s agricultural sector, real estate, infrastructure, tourism, and the
manufacturing sector, as well. Saudi Arabia’s business community as well, is willing to invest in
the Sudan. However, regional, and international support for the Sudan is critically hampered by
the clashes between the civilian and the military components of the transitional authorities in the
Sudan. The military’s second coup in October 2021, and the resignation of the civilian Prime
Minister Abdullah Hamdok on January 3, 2022, brough the country to unprecedented level of
stalemate and at the brink of total collapse. Sudan’s strategic location and its outlet at Red Sea

16
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provides the opportunity to play a vital role in the development of the region, in the Central and
northern African regions, and throughout the continent.
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic or, The Western Sahara Region
Western Sahara is a disputed region, according to the United Nations. Most of the territory
is under Moroccan rule, while 10% is under the rule of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR). The leading national liberation movement Polisario (from the Spanish abbreviation of
Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro) acts as a well-organized
government with a head of state, a cabinet, ministries, and departments. This organizational
structure is unique to the Sahrawi people. In fact, the Sahrawi population of 163,600 has lived in
the Tindouf Refugee Camp in Algeria, across the border from Western Sahara over the past 45
years.
In 1976, upon Spanish decolonization of the territory, Polisario declared the new Sahrawi
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), and over 85 countries recognized its independence. On
February 22, 1984, SADR became a member of the Organization of the African States (OAS). The
King of Morocco, Hassan II, objected to the independence of Western Sahara, withdrew from the
OAS the same year, and called upon the people of Morocco to march into the territory.
Accordingly, 350,000 Moroccans entered the region in what became known as the Green March.
This step antagonized the OAS, Algeria in particular, and many other countries around the world.
The United Nations attempted to resolve the conflict as early as 1976, a process that culminated
with the establishment of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in
1991.18
The current Coronavirus pandemic represents both a challenge and an unprecedented
opportunity to resolve the conflict. A closer cooperation between the parties could mitigate the
impact of the outbreak on the Sahrawi people, both in the Tindouf Camp and at home. The camp
urgently needs medical equipment and resources. The UN has recently appealed for financial
support, requesting $15 million to meet the urgent needs of the refugees.
The disease provides opposing parties the opportunity to show goodwill and work together
to meet the urgent needs of the suffering Sahrawi refugees, and not least, to demonstrate
willingness to resolve once and for all the conflict that has divided this part of Africa over four
decades. Proposals for a resolution are already on the table, but they are still antagonistic. Morocco
advocates autonomy within the kingdom, while the Polisario and Algeria advocate for
independence and self-determination. A resolution will most certainly bring about an
unprecedented level of regional cooperation between Algeria and Morocco. Its spillover will affect
North Africa and the Middle East as well.
If reconciliation does not happen now, there is the possibility of conflict escalation. The
Polisario, sole representative of the Sahrawi, recently expressed its disappointment in the role of
the UN and the international community in resolving the conflict peacefully. The UN has never
been able to resolve this conflict through UN resolutions, like a referendum for self-determination.
Morocco claims sovereignty and has recently made some gains toward the legitimization of its
control over the territory. Since the return of Morocco to the AU in 2017, several African countries
opened consulates in the Western Saharan capital Laayoune, while many other African and Arab
countries reject Morocco’s claim such as South Africa, Kenya, Botswana, Ethiopia, Libya, Mali,
and Namibia. Algeria proved its unwavering support of the Sahrawis over the past forty years, and
18
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consistently commits to their self-determination, and their right to reinstate their own government
in the territory.
There is no doubt that, the incompatibility of conflict-resolution schemes renders the
Western Sahara as one of the most challenging conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Sahrawis are faced
by the uncompromising Moroccan claims of sovereignty over the region. This claim added to other
regional challenges in North Africa fuels animosity between the two traditional rivals, Morocco,
and Algeria. As far as Mauritania is concerned, Nouakchott has relinquished its territorial claims
over Western Sahara as early as 1979, however Mauritania remains one of the key players to the
resolution of the conflict. In terms of the continued role of the UN and its involvement in the
conflict, the Security Council called on the parties to the conflict to resume peaceful negotiations
on April 9, 2020. The UNSC reiterated previous resolutions calling for roundtable negotiations to
bring about an end to the conflict.
The Security Council’s announcement has attempted to draw the attention to the conflict
in Western Sahara, however the challenge is that- amidst the Coronavirus crisis, neither the
international community nor the parties to the conflict have demonstrated willingness to move
forward with negotiations. Contrary, the threat of the spread of the virus across North Africa,
especially in Algeria, Morocco and Western Sahara would seems to escalate the conflict. Under
the conditions of a protracted crises of legitimacy and economic decline in Algeria, a year-long
popular protest, the regime may explore external threats as a mechanism to unify a divided country.
As mentioned before, Algerian armed forces conducted maneuvers with live ammunition close the
borders of Morocco on May 5, 2020 at the peak of the Coronavirus pandemic. The same day,
during the annual meeting of Non-Aligned Movement, which was hosted by Azerbaijan under the
banner of United Against COVID-19 Summit, Morocco and Algeria traded accusations over
Western Sahara. The Algerian President referred to “occupied lands, as is the case in Palestine and
Western Sahara.”19, while calling for the end to hostilities globally. Morocco responded in kind,
launching a direct attack on Algeria. Its Foreign Affairs Minister accused Algeria of “fueling
separatism”. He stated that, “despite the exceptional current circumstances, a neighboring country
continues to fuel separatism, in violation of the of founding principles of NAM…this country,
instead of using its resources to improve the precarious situation of its population in the context of
the COVID-19, diverts them to fuel regional destabilization.”20 On another occasion, and when
asked by the media about the possibility of resorting to international financial institutions to
mitigate the decline of the prices of oil and its impact on the economy, and assist Algeria in dealing
with the COVID-19 pandemic, Algerian president Tiboune made a clear reference to Western
Sahara. He stated that, “you will no longer be able to defend causes like the Palestinian cause and
the Western Saharan Conflict.”21
On May 13, 2020, Algerian media reported that in a conversation with some Moroccan
citizens seeking his support for repatriation because of the Coronavirus, The Moroccan Counsel
General in the Algerian city of Oran described Algeria as an “enemy”. The next day, the Moroccan
ambassador was summoned by the Algerian Foreign Affairs Ministry who denied the incident.
Clearly, the two countries are escalating the conflict rather than deescalating it.
19
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Rabat has utilized the Corona pandemic to strengthen its credentials in Africa. The King’s
call for a unified African response to the crisis aims at just that. Morocco continues to underline a
Neo-Pan-Africanism approach in its foreign policy, grounding it in its national interests and
national security. i.e., influencing and shaping the African Union’s views on the Western Saharan
conflict. Most notably, renaming its foreign affairs ministry to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
African Cooperation and Moroccans Abroad. Rabat has made some gains in this aspect convincing
some African countries to open up diplomatic posts in what it calls Morocco’s Southern Provinces.
While such advances are viewed damaging by the Polisario and Algeria, both are determined that
a full-scale support for Morocco’s perspective on the conflict never materializes. Both the Polisario
and Algeria protested such diplomatic moves and sought a UN clear position on the Morocco’s
efforts to alter the status of the territory, by a de facto strategic change on the ground. This explains
the fact that, the overwhelming majority of the African states, as well as member of the
international community continues to view Western Sahara as an occupied territory. To prevent a
full-scale recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, there is no doubt that
Algeria is willing to engage in a regional war. In fact, a war at this point would serve the Algerian
regime well, at a time it suffers from a crisis of legitimacy. Such crisis is a natural outcome to six
decades of mismanagement, corruption, and bureaucratic elites’ rivalry over state resources. A war
over Western Sahara would unify the country, rally Algerians behind the flag, and diffuses statecivil society tension.
The Polisario has expressed its dismay over lack of progress in the negotiations and the
seemingly lack of interest on the part of the international community in resolving the conflict. It is
obvious to observers that, Morocco is taking drastic efforts to establish its sovereignty over the
territory, while the UN in particular has not demonstrated major objection to Rabat’s efforts. It is
no secret that Morocco’s foreign affairs ministry had made it abundantly clear that it will not spare
any effort to strengthen its claims over Western Sahara.
Morocco has become innovative as well in creating stakes for its strategic partners in
Western Sahara such as the EU, and China. Rabat has been giving concessions especially in the
fisheries sector to the EU, and China with the aim of mobilizing support for its views on the
Western Saharan conflict. In so doing, Morocco aims also to undermine the traditional alliance
between Algeria and China. Western Sahara is a very rich territory with abundance of phosphate,
uranium, gold silver, and potentially its shores are rich with crude oil and natural gas.
China has already had a 25-year fisheries agreement with Mauritania, and another
concession from Morocco would strengthen its gains in northwestern Africa fishing sector.
Similarly, the EU aims at dominance in the fisheries sector as well in northwestern Africa and the
shores of the Atlantic. The EU member states are driven by national interest consideration rather
than commitment to the principles of self-determination, decolonization, human rights, or defense
of indigenous people’s rights as they may claim from time to time. That applies to the EU at large
and to individual European players in the conflict as well such as Spain, France, Italy. The
exception here is the European Court of Justice. The court ruled on February 27, 2018, that the
Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco
signed in 2005 that the bilateral agricultural agreement between Morocco and the EU violates
international law as it included Western Sahara within the agreement. The court stated that, “the
territory of Western Sahara is not covered by the concept of “territory of Morocco.” 22. Therefore,
the court confirmed the status of the territory as a disputed region. China as well, is driven by its
22
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national interests, though maintaining a delicate balance between its historical ties with Algeria
and its growing portfolio of interests with Morocco.
Sahrawis are magnified by what they call the “colonial” mentality governs the Moroccan
presence in the territory, namely resource-extraction policy. Similar to European colonial
experiences in Africa, Western Sahara is exposed to a massive process of resource-extraction
designed to create stakes for European, Chinese and American corporations in the phosphate, oil
and gas, minerals, and fishing sectors to ensure political support to the Moroccan perspective on
the conflict. Sahrawis see their land and wealth ripped off, while they suffer unemployment,
poverty, diseases, and misery in refugee camps since the 1980s. This situation in particular has
mobilized a large segment of the Sahrawi youth to enlist in the Polisario, train and prepare for the
upcoming confrontation with the Moroccan army.
In this complex realist world of contending interests, the fear is that the Sahrawis would
give up totally on the international community. The relative peace among Sahrawis should not be
misinterpreted as incompetence in waging a war of liberation. Contrary, the Sahrawis are capable
to wage such war, and in so doing, they will not be left alone. The Polisario had committed itself
decades ago to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, however, the pandemic may convince
Sahrawis of the futility of the peace process and compels the movement to pursue the armed
struggle option to accomplish its independence. In fact, this is exactly what occurred in response
to the UN’s announcement on May 5, 2020. The Polisario expressed its disappointment in the UN,
its mission, and its role in resolving the conflict. The growing impatience among the youth segment
in Tindouf is also noticeable especially over the past two years, 2020 and 2021. Furthermore,
developments in Western Sahara are reflection to the Algerian-Morocco geopolitical conflicts.
However, the role of United Nations, the European Union, the African Union (AU), and the Arab
League remains necessary to advance the cause of peace. Probably, the AU is currently in a much
better condition to launch a peace process if compared by other regional or international
organizations. African crises require an African solution, with the support of the international
community.
Conclusion
The Coronavirus outbreak has tested the North African region, its governments, and the
resilience of its people. The individual nations’ ability to respond to the epidemic is shaped by a
host of domestic, regional, and international factors. On a national level, success or failure is
measured by the availability of resources necessary to withstand the crisis. While some countries
such as Morocco and Tunisia mobilized their national resources and strengthened coordination
between state and civil society, Algeria’s response is married by a prolonged civil conflict, while
the protracted attrition war in Libya impairs state and civil society response. Mauritania’s response
is limited by its insufficient resources and a weak healthcare sector, though both state and civil
society are struggling to coordinate national efforts and seek international support. In Sudan, a
dysfunctional public healthcare sector, the consequences of the military coup, the civilian-military
coalition government, and international sanctions have also impaired an efficient response to the
crisis. Such conditions render unstable the governing national unity coalition. Egypt took a
proactive stance to contain the zoonotic disease since the mid-2020 to the present. Moroccans call
for a unified continental response across Africa but have not produced any substantial institutional
response.
There is no coordination among North African nations because each has its own
unsurmountable challenges, and there is no institutional regional framework. Albeit the countries
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are intrinsically linked by cultural, ethnic, geographical, and historical considerations. Individual
nations are cooperating with the European Union, the World Health Organization, the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, the Arab league, and the African Union, but the whole of North
Africa lacks a crisis management center, which is necessary to combat cross-border challenges. In
fact, the contagion necessities regional coordination, but regional response is absent.
The Coronavirus pandemics will not disappear soon, nor will it be the last crisis facing the
region. Therefore, regional cooperation is a must, and a North African Crisis Management Center
can be a solution to design and implement regional-level responses to cross border calamities.
Other instruments would include a unified media awareness campaign, regional economic
cooperation, border control, and combatting regional security threats. While such cooperation may
seem challenging because of the various geostrategic conflicts in the region, it is essential for the
collective national self-interests and national security.
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